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LIES, FREE SPEECH, AND THE LAW

Distrust, Negative
First Amendment
Theory, and the
Regulation of Lies
By Helen Norton

In April 2022, the Knight Institute hosted a symposium, titled
“Lies, Free Speech, and the Law,” to explore how the law
regulates or should regulate false and misleading speech.
The symposium was overseen by the Institute’s Senior
Visiting Research Scholar Genevieve Lakier and took place
at Columbia University.
The essays in this series were originally presented and
discussed at this event. Written by some of the country’s
leading scholars of law, political science, history, and
technology, they focus on five themes that examine the
connections between lies, freedom of speech (construed
broadly), and the law: 1) the sociological and constitutional
status of false or misleading speech; 2) defining the category
of lies; 3) structural regulation and the problem of lies; 4)
government lies; and 5) the deregulation of disclosure.
The symposium was conceptualized by Knight Institute staff,
including Jameel Jaffer, executive director; Katy Glenn Bass,
research director; Genevieve Lakier, senior visiting research
scholar; Alex Abdo, litigation director; and Larry Siems,
chief of staff. The essay series was edited by Glenn Bass
and Lakier with additional support from Lorraine Kenny,
communications director; A. Adam Glenn, writer/editor;
Madeline Wood, research coordinator; Kushal Dev, research
fellow; and Sam Subramanian, intern.
The full series is available at knightcolumbia.org/research/
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INTRODUCTION

hat we have government at all is largely because we distrust
each other: At its best, government establishes and enforces the
rule of law to create the conditions that enable all sorts of valuable
endeavors.1 But even as we need our government to protect us from each
other, we also need to protect ourselves from our government.2 For this
reason, the American constitutional tradition tells a story of simultaneous
distrust of the people and of the government.3
First Amendment law exemplifies this tradition of distrust. While courts
and commentators have long posited that speech deserves constitutional protection when it is affirmatively valuable in facilitating democratic self-governance, enlightenment, and individual autonomy,4 the First Amendment
tradition also relies on what many call a negative theory of the Free Speech
Clause. Under this approach, the Constitution protects speech not so much
because it is so valuable, but instead because the government is so dangerous in its capacity to abuse its regulatory power. Negative free speech
theory thus understands the First Amendment to be more about our fears
of the government than about our affirmative aspirations of the good.5 (At
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the same time, “negative” and “affirmative” First Amendment theories are
not mutually exclusive, and courts and commentators commonly rely on
multiple theories rather than insisting on any one free speech theory to the
exclusion of all others.6)
In short, negative First Amendment theory is about a negative value:
distrust of government.7 And because the government gives us plenty of
reason to distrust it, negative theory packs substantial power.
The many examples of negative theory at work include United States v.
Alvarez,8 where a divided Supreme Court invalidated the federal Stolen Valor
Act, a law that punished intentional falsehoods about receiving military honors. That case required the Court to consider a speaker’s criminal conviction
for his self-aggrandizing lie that he had received the Congressional Medal of
Honor. Although all parties agreed that that law neither punished nor chilled
any valuable speech,9 the plurality relied on negative theory—that is, a focus
on constraining the government rather than protecting worthy speech—to
uphold the First Amendment challenge:
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense,
whether shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper,
would endorse government authority to compile a list of subjects about
which false statements are punishable. That governmental power has no
clear limiting principle. Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea
that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.10

It’s easiest to see negative theory in action when the Court strikes down
the government’s regulation of speech viewed as having no affirmative value,
as was the case of the lies about military service in Alvarez. But negative
theory increasingly dominates the contemporary Court’s approach to a wide
range of other First Amendment problems.11
In Reed v. Gilbert, for instance, the majority relied on negative theory
when it announced that it would apply strict scrutiny to all content- and
speaker-based distinctions even absent evidence of the government’s malign
motive.12 Reed struck down, on Free Speech Clause grounds, a town’s sign
ordinance that prohibited some signs and permitted others in sufficiently
counterintuitive ways that all of the justices found that the ordinance failed
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even rational basis scrutiny.13 Even so, the majority announced more broadly
that it would apply strict scrutiny whenever the government distinguished
between speech based on content14—making no effort to explain and distinguish the many instances where the government has long made content-based distinctions without triggering First Amendment attention (much
less suspicion).15 In contrast, Justices Breyer’s and Kagan’s concurrences
doubted the wisdom of this sweeping bright-line rule, describing it as inconsistent with longstanding precedent and practice.16
In my view, Breyer and Kagan were right to resist. Negative theory, like
any free speech theory, needs limiting principles that explain when the
government’s regulation of expression is constitutionally permissible—and
when it is not. Without limits, negative theory always militates against the
government’s regulation of speech even though a completely absolutist
approach is both costly and unworkable, stripping elected officials of the
ability to solve pressing public problems.17 In other words, negative theory
serves as a guardrail on government, but negative theory warrants guardrails
of its own to prevent the paralysis that accompanies unbounded distrust.18
We need both to protect ourselves from the government and to empower the
government to serve and protect us.
But when does the government deserve our distrust—or our trust? As
ethicist and political scientist Russell Hardin observed, our choices to trust
or distrust are largely informed by inductive reasoning—that is, by our own
past experience of “the motivation of the potentially trusted person to attend
to the truster’s interests and his or her competence to do so.”19 Trust and
distrust are necessarily both episodic20 and comparative21 assessments:
Whether we trust (or distrust) a specific actor turns on large part on when
we’re asked and compared to whom. Changes over time and technology
can alter our experience and thus change the subjects of our distrust.22 And
although our experience frequently leads us to distrust the government (and
that there are many government actors only complicates these assessments),
sometimes our experience leads us to distrust powerful private speakers
even more.23
Adding to the complexity of these assessments, a “central problem with
trust and distrust is that they are essentially cognitive assessments of the
trustworthiness of the other party and may therefore be mistaken” through
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both false positives and false negatives.24 This leads political scientist
Deborah Welch Larson to urge that we “assess the epistemological basis
for our distrust. Where there is a possibility that distrust is based on snap
judgments or automatic stereotyping, we might try to calculate the other’s
interests and assess the other’s past behavior.”25
Related to the question of when to apply negative theory is the question
of how to use negative theory. For example, courts can use negative theory as
a rule of decision itself: Under this approach, courts apply strict scrutiny to
strike down the government’s restriction of speech when they see evidence
of the government’s untrustworthy motive or incompetence—regardless of
the regulated expression’s lack of affirmative value.26 Or courts can instead
use negative theory as a tiebreaker when various free speech theories point
in different directions: Under these circumstances, one could choose to apply
negative theory as a tiebreaker such that close cases always go against the
government.27 Or courts can instead include negative theory as one of several
factors in a balancing analysis where they weigh the harm threatened by the
contested expression against the risk that the government will enforce the
law in a partisan or clumsy manner.28
In this essay, I examine the relationship between negative First Amendment theory and the government’s regulation of lies.29 As a descriptive matter, I highlight the prevalence and power of negative theory when assessing
the constitutionality of laws restricting lies. And as a prescriptive matter, I
suggest that the principled application of negative theory—rooted, as it is, in
distrust of the government’s potential for regulatory overreach and abuse—
requires that we attend to the inductive nature of distrust. More specifically,
I propose that the principled application of negative theory requires us to
ask, rather than assume, whether the government is regulating in a context
where it is especially dangerous because of its malignance or clumsiness, or
where its enforcement discretion is unbounded. Conversely, negative theory
should pack less power in settings where the government’s discretion is
limited, where we don’t see evidence of its self-interest or incompetence, or
where listeners can’t protect themselves from powerful private speakers such
that we distrust nongovernmental parties even more than the government.
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TRIGGERS FOR DISTRUST:
SIGNS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S
MALIGN MOTIVES OR INCOMPETENCE

o say that we distrust the government to regulate in a certain
area means that experience leads us to believe that the government
in that setting does not have trustworthy intentions or that it is not
competent. When does our experience support those conclusions? That
distrust is an inductive concept based on our experience with the subject’s
motives and competence (and is thus both episodic and comparative) suggests the value of looking for factors (or triggers) that increase our distrust
of the government, as well as factors (or contraindications) that ameliorate
our distrust.
Legal scholar Ronald Cass viewed negative First Amendment theory
itself as a type of inductive reasoning that requires us, first, to identify the
specific historic governmental abuses that inspired distrust and thus the
ratification of the First Amendment; second, to identify the key characteristics shared by those historic governmental abuses; and, finally, to apply
negative First Amendment theory to curb contemporary government actions
that appropriately trigger our distrust because they display those same
characteristics.30
Characterizing the original understanding of the speech and press
clauses in negative theory terms as “a modest damage-control effort; not
concerned broadly with speech, but designed to place some regulation
beyond government’s power,”31 Cass identified press licensing and seditious
libel as the historical governmental abuses of power that particularly troubled the framers. He then identified the key characteristics shared by those
abuses to be certain dangerous governmental motives: its self-interest—i.e.,
the government’s suppression of criticism for partisan or other self-protective
reasons—and its intolerance of unorthodox or uncomfortable ideas.32
The government’s regulation of speech should thus leave us more or
less distrustful depending on whether it occurs in a setting when we have
more or less reason to worry about its self-interested or intolerant motive.33
Emphasizing that the framers’ negative theory concerns did not extend to
all government regulation of speech,34 Cass explained that:
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These principles do not so much mandate outcomes as allow courts to worry
about the right issues: Is the speech regulation a product of personal dislike,
pique, or whim on the part of government officials? Is it the product of intolerance for the message conveyed? Or is it an ordinary exercise of government’s
power to regulate activities so as to avoid harm? These principles do not
firmly tie judges’ hands in deciding speech controversies. … Courts still must
in effect balance the costs and benefits of particular speech regulations.35

Recall too Hardin’s work, which suggests that the government’s regulation of speech should trigger our distrust when we have reason to worry about
its competence (as well as its motives).36 Negative free speech theory thus
appropriately attends to settings where the government might overestimate
expression’s danger because of its limited information or expertise, or where
governmental decision-makers are especially vulnerable to cognitive and
emotional biases.37 Here too, experience can illuminate the government’s
competence as well as motives.38
Along these lines, the majority and concurring opinions in Reed v. Gilbert
both searched for signals of the government’s untrustworthy motives—but
fingered very different triggers for the application of negative theory to solve
Free Speech Clause problems. On one hand, the majority identified the government’s content-based speech distinctions, by themselves, as triggers for
distrust and the application of strict scrutiny (the doctrinal expression of
courts’ distrust of government’s regulatory efforts). In so doing, the majority emphasized its fear that future officials would exploit content-based
distinctions for self-interested purposes even if contemporary officials had
no such intent:
Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by
a facially content-based statute, as future government officials may
one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is why
the First Amendment expressly targets the operation of the laws—i.e., the
“abridge[ment] of speech”—rather than merely the motives of those who
enacted them.39

On the other hand, Justices Kagan’s and Breyer’s concurring opinions
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protested that negative theory should not control the Court’s doctrine absent
more specific indications of the government’s self-interest or intolerance.
They urged very different triggers for distrust of government’s regulatory
efforts: the government’s viewpoint-based distinctions and its restriction of
an entire topic in public discourse.40
Rejecting the majority’s reflexive reliance on negative theory, Justice
Kagan suggested the value of “common sense” for identifying additional
circumstances that should trigger courts’ distrust of the government’s regulatory efforts41 (that is, circumstances involving any “‘realistic possibility
that official suppression of ideas is afoot’”42). Common sense, as historian
Sophia Rosenfeld explains, itself reflects inductive reasoning as it stems from
our “common experiences and shared faculties as humans.”43

TRIGGERS FOR DISTRUST:
THE GOVERNMENT’S UNBOUNDED DISCRETION

T

he breadth and malleability of the government’s interventions can enable regulatory abuse by a partisan or clumsy government. For this reason, as the Alvarez opinions make clear, laws that
restrict lies by conferring the government with unbounded discretion trigger
the Court’s distrust. The Alvarez plurality sought to mitigate these concerns
by requiring the government to tether its regulation to lies that threaten
certain harms and tailor such regulation to those settings and audiences
where those harms are more likely.44 Justice Breyer’s concurrence (joined by
Justice Kagan) similarly emphasized the dangers of governmental regulation
untethered to harm of some sort. That opinion extolled the constitutionality
of laws that:
tend to be narrower than the statute before us, in that they limit the scope of
their application, sometimes by requiring proof of specific harm to identifiable victims; sometimes by specifying that the lies be made in contexts in
which a tangible harm to others is especially likely to occur; and sometimes
by limiting the prohibited lies to those that are particularly likely to produce
harm. …
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Statutes forbidding lying to a government official (not under oath) are typically limited to circumstances where a lie is likely to work particular and specific harm by interfering with the functioning of a government department,
and those statutes also require a showing of materiality. …
Statutes prohibiting false claims of terrorist attacks, or other lies about the
commission of crimes or catastrophes, require proof that substantial public
harm be directly foreseeable, or, if not, involve false statements that are very
likely to bring about that harm.45

Although far from clear in its specifics,46 the concurrence emphasized
that government officials can address negative theory concerns by tethering
the regulated lie to the likelihood of harm.47 The absence of such a tether
triggers distrust, in Breyer’s view, and thus justifies the application of negative theory to invalidate those laws:
[T]hat breadth means that it creates a significant risk of First Amendment
harm. As written, it applies in family, social, or other private contexts, where
lies will often cause little harm. It also applies in political contexts, where
although such lies are more likely to cause harm, the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors is also high. … And so the prohibition may be applied
where it should not be applied, for example, to bar stool braggadocio or, in
the political arena, subtly but selectively to speakers that the Government
does not like. These considerations lead me to believe that the statute as
written risks significant First Amendment harm.48

L

CONTRAINDICATIONS FOR DISTRUST:
TETHERING REGULATED LIES TO
“SOMETHING MORE”

ies’ enormous variety and ubiquity mean that the government’s
regulation of lies, without more, enables its overreach. For this reason, the plurality described past precedent “to instruct that falsity
alone may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”49 In
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its view, “[w]ere the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone
is sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the speech
was used to gain a material advantage, it would give government a broad
censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional
tradition.”50 So too did the concurrence identify the regulation of “falsity
without more” as triggering its distrust.51 When insisting on something
“more,” courts seek to limit the government’s enforcement discretion, thus
cabining its potential for abuse and overreach.
To be sure, the justices struggled to articulate the requisite something
“more.” The plurality insisted that the targeted lies inflict “legally cognizable harm”—illustrating, rather than defining, that phrase to include
“defamation, fraud, or some other legally cognizable harm associated with
a false statement, such as an invasion of privacy or the costs of vexatious
litigation.”52 This tendency to focus on lies that inflict tangible and individualized harm like financial or reputational harm is not because other
lies don’t threaten significant harm, but instead because of concerns that
the challenges of proving less tangible or collective harm will enable the
government’s overreaching, self-interest, bias, or incompetence to infect
its enforcement decisions.
At a minimum, the requisite “more” includes lies that inflict financial and reputational harms, all of the justices agreed. But so too did all of
the justices endorse the constitutionality of laws that punish lies that seek
to change—or are predictably capable of changing—the target’s course of
conduct to the liar’s advantage.53 In this vein, all nine justices indicated
their constitutional comfort with laws that prohibit speakers from falsely
representing themselves to be government officials (what I’ve called lies to
misappropriate public power54), as well as laws that broadly prohibit lies to
the government (what I’ve called lies to manipulate public power55)—even
though such lies often inflict harms that do not involve financial, reputational, or other harms traditionally thought tangible or monetizable.
First, all nine justices endorsed the constitutionality of the many laws
that prohibit a speaker from falsely representing herself to be a government
official, like a police officer.56 We can think about these as lies about being
the government, in other words, as a type of lie about who’s talking, a type
of lie about the source of speech.57
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Of course, these sorts of lies are often told to obtain a financial benefit
for the liar—by, for instance, extorting money from vulnerable targets.58 But
courts have also interpreted these laws to prohibit lies to influence the listener to change her “course of conduct.” For instance, the Court has held
that federal law prohibits a speaker’s lie that he was a law enforcement
officer—told to convince his listener to divulge information that she was otherwise unwilling to disclose—because it sought to cause the target to change
her course of conduct (to speak when she preferred to remain silent).59 As
the Court recognized, “[A] person may be defrauded although he parts with
something of no measurable value at all.”60
So too did all of the justices support the constitutionality of the Federal
False Statements Act, which criminalizes all sorts of lies to the federal government.61 While such lies are often told to obtain a financial benefit like a
government contract, this law also prohibits lies that seek to divert enforcement officials’ investigative attention or otherwise influence government’s
decision-making to the liar’s advantage.62 According to the Court, these lies
are regulable because they seek to manipulate their listeners’ conduct—that
is, the government’s decisions about how to allocate its time, effort, and
other resources.63
All three of the opinions supported the constitutionality of these sorts of
laws. In so doing, the justices did not view these laws as prohibiting “falsity
without more.” The something “more” rests in the lie’s intent or capacity
to change the listener’s course of conduct to the liar’s advantage. Here the
Court appeared to rely on “common sense” (rather than demand empirical
evidence) to predict such lies’ capacity to affect their targets’ choices. I share
its sense of how the world works in this respect even as I note the difficulty
of predicting when the Court will require evidence of the harms threatened
by certain speech and when it will not.
Legislators can additionally tether regulated lies to something “more,”
and thus limit the government’s enforcement discretion, by targeting those
settings where harm is likely. In this vein, the Alvarez plurality contrasted the
Stolen Valor Act (which “by its plain terms applies to a false statement made
at any time, in any place, to any person”64) with the Federal False Statements
Act and its limitations on topic and audience: “Section 1001’s prohibition
on false statements made [1] to Government officials, in communications
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[2] concerning official matters, does not lead to the broader proposition that
false statements are unprotected when made to any person, at any time, in
any context.”65
We can see related intuitions at work in other settings where the Court
has signaled its comfort with the regulation of lies about the source of
speech. For instance, the Court has long upheld laws that require speakers
to identify themselves as the source of political contributions and campaign
advertisements, recognizing that accurate information about the source of
speech often influences listeners’ course of conduct in important ways.66
And precisely because listeners frequently rely on the source of speech as a
proxy for that expression’s credibility and quality, speakers not infrequently
mislead listeners about their identities. Here’s one illustration, documented
by Spencer Overton: In the 2016 election, fake Facebook pages targeted
Black users and falsely claimed to be authored by two Black men saying
“‘We don’t have any other choice this time but to boycott the election. … No
one represents Black people. Don’t go to vote.’”67 Other examples include
the deployment of deepfake technologies that make speech look and sound
like it’s coming from somebody other than the actual speaker.68
Other lies about the source of speech are similarly, and predictably,
capable of influencing their targets’ conduct to the liar’s advantage—and
thus tethered to harm in ways that should leave courts slower to distrust laws
that regulate them. Think, for instance, of a candidate’s lies that she is the
incumbent (a lie not terribly different from a lie that one is a law enforcement
officer69) when voters frequently rely on incumbency as a heuristic (or cognitive shortcut) in their decision-making.70 Think too of a speaker’s lies about
who has endorsed her candidacy that seek to influence listeners’ course of
conduct to the liar’s advantage.71
The same is true of lies about voting requirements and procedures:
They are lies about objectively verifiable facts that are predictably capable
of interfering with their targets’ ability to vote (thus influencing their targets’
conduct to the liar’s advantage). As the Court has signaled, these lies are also
regulable consistent with the First Amendment.72
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INVOKING NEGATIVE THEORY
BY PRETENDING THAT HARD FIRST AMENDMENT
PROBLEMS ARE EASY

S

o far I’ve examined potential triggers for (and sometimes contraindications of) distrust of the government’s regulatory interventions,
and thus the application of negative theory. But sometimes courts
justify the application of negative theory to invalidate the government’s
efforts by discounting or ignoring lies’ capacity to influence their targets’
course of conduct to the liar’s advantage.73 Recall, for instance, how in
his Alvarez concurrence, Justice Breyer was quick to dismiss the capacity
of lies in family settings to cause harm.74 But as documented in detail by
legal scholar Jill Elaine Hasday, lies in intimate environments can and do
inflict serious physical, financial, and dignitary harms and influence their
targets’ course of conduct to the liar’s advantage in a variety of ways.75 As
Hasday demonstrates, courts have long discounted these harms based on
the assumption “that people deceived within intimate relationships do not
and should not have access to remedies that are available to people deceived
in other contexts.”76
For the same reasons and with the same results, courts sometimes overstate the effectiveness of counterspeech in remedying the harms threatened
by lies and other expression.77 As G.S. Hans observes, courts often rely on
the availability of counterspeech when invoking negative theory to strike
down the government’s regulation—not because counterspeech is demonstrably effective, but instead to justify its fear of the government’s potential
for regulatory overreach.78 Negative theory presumes that the unwilling
or unhappy listener can protect herself through exit or voice79—in other
words, by simply ignoring or leaving the discussion if she doesn’t like what
she hears, or by rebutting and protesting. But that presumption should
exert little force in settings and relationships where vulnerable listeners
experience inequalities of information and power—and thus for whom exit
and voice may not be available, increasing the likelihood that lies in those
settings will inflict harm.80
These judicial choices are not inevitable. The principled application of
negative theory requires comparative risk assessments, and courts can (and
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sometimes do) weigh the risk of harm to comparatively vulnerable listeners
more heavily than the risk of the government’s regulatory abuse.81

N

CONCLUSION

egative theory requires us to attend to the risk of the government’s regulatory abuse and overreach when regulating lies and
other potentially harmful expression.82 To be sure, negative theory
plays a valuable role in solving First Amendment problems. But its reflexive
deployment has its costs. As Frederick Schauer describes this dynamic:
“Fearful of the errors of mistaken judgment, the First Amendment of fear
chooses to minimize the likelihood of such mistakes by largely withdrawing
the power to judge altogether. Fearful of the worst, it is willing to sacrifice
aspiration for the best.”83 Negative theory, when properly applied, requires
courts to be transparent about the costs of this trade-off and about who
bears those costs.
Our assessments of the government’s motivations and competence are
key to when negative theory does (or should do) more or less First Amendment work. To this end, I urge that we take care to explain when and why we
fear some government actors more than others, and when and why we fear
the government more than private actors (and vice versa). More specifically,
the principled application of negative theory does not pretend that hard
Free Speech Clause problems are easy by minimizing the harms of regulated
lies nor by exaggerating the effectiveness of counterspeech in preventing
those harms. And the principled application of negative theory identifies
specific triggers for distrust (like evidence of the government’s untrustworthy motives, its incompetence, its unfair surprise, or its unbounded
discretion)—and recognizes that negative theory should carry less force
when those triggers are absent.
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speech). To be sure, some lies warrant First Amendment protection because they are affirmatively valuable (like lies to protect privacy or comfort the sick or
frightened) or because their regulation chills valuable speech (by punishing accidental falsehoods
in ways that make folks reluctant to speak at all on
certain topics). See Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 Sup. Ct. Rev. 161, 164-70 (2012).
9

10

Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion).

Note that negative theory has not always played
such a large role in First Amendment doctrine. See
Genevieve Lakier, The Non-First Amendment Law
of Freedom of Speech, 134 Harv. L. Rev. 2299, 2348
(2021) (“What these debates thus illuminate is the
existence of what we might call a second strand of
eighteenth and nineteenth century discourse and
practice about freedom of speech—one that, in contrast to the first, constitutional strand of discourse
and practice, assumed that government intervention
into the marketplace of ideas was sometimes necessary to protect expressive liberty and the democratic
values it facilitated. The two strands were not incompatible with one another. Both, after all, granted the
government considerable power to regulate speech
when necessary to promote the public good.”).
11

12

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S 155 (2015).

13

Id. at 179 (Kagan, J., concurring).

14

Id. at 163-65 (majority opinion).

Id. at 578 (Breyer, J., concurring) (listing examples that include securities law, consumer protection
law, professional responsibility law, and more).
15

Id. at 181-82 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Although
the majority insists that applying strict scrutiny to
all such ordinances is ‘essential’ to protecting First
Amendment freedoms, I find it challenging to understand why that is so. . . . We apply strict scrutiny
to facially content-based regulations of speech, in
keeping with the rationales just described, when
there is any ‘realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.’ That is always the case when
the regulation facially differentiates on the basis of
viewpoint. It is also the case (except in non-public
16

or limited public forums) when a law restricts ‘discussion of an entire topic’ in public debate. . . . But
when that is not realistically possible, we may do
well to relax our guard so that ‘entirely reasonable’
laws imperiled by strict scrutiny can survive.”).
See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc.,
140 S. Ct. 2335, 2360 (2020) (Breyer, J., concurring and
dissenting) (“Put simply, treating all content-based
distinctions on speech as presumptively unconstitutional is unworkable and would obstruct the
ordinary workings of democratic governance.”).
17

See Hardin, supra note 1, at 96 (“Distrust in a
world in which others are untrustworthy does, of
course, protect one against losses that would follow
from taking the risk of cooperating with others. But
it can wreck one’s own opportunities in a society or
context in which others are generally trustworthy.
The meaningful result of trust, when it is justified,
is to enable cooperation; the result of distrust is to
block even the attempt at cooperation.”).
18

Russell Hardin, Distrust: Manifestations and
Management, in Distrust 3, 8 (Russell Hardin ed.,
2004); see also Hardin, supra note 2, at 17 (“To say we
trust you means we believe that you have the right
intentions toward us and that you are competent to
do what we trust you to do.”).
19

For an example of an episodic understanding of
trust and distrust, see Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 Colum.
L. Rev. 449, 449-50 (1985) (“[T]he overriding objective
at all times should be to equip the first amendment
to do maximum service in those historical periods
when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and
most likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first
amendment, in other words, should be targeted for
the worst of times.”).
20

Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 11, 7374 (1981) (“[D]istrust is a comparative notion. The
allocation of authority between the state and the
individual is a function not simply of how much
trust should be placed in the capacity of private individuals to process communications thoughtfully
and responsibly. Distrust of the state, particularly in
its censorial capacity, is a fundamental value that
informs the first amendment.”).
21

DISTRUST, NEGATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT THEORY, AND THE REGULATION OF LIES

17

22

See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?,

17-01 Knight First Amend. Inst., Sept. 1, 2017, at
2-3, https://knightcolumbia.org/content/tim-wufirst-amendment-obsolete [https://perma.cc/9FQ7ND7M] (describing the challenges that arise in
21st century speech environments when powerful
parties, and not just the government, threaten free
speech).
23

See Hardin, supra note 1, at 89 (“[D]istrust is

sometimes the only credible implication of the evidence. Indeed, distrust is sometimes not merely a
rational assessment but it is also benign, in that it
protects against harms rather than causing them.”).
24

Hardin, supra note 19, at 9.

25

Deborah Welch Larson, Distrust: Prudent, If Not

Always Wise, in Distrust 34, 54 (Russell Hardin ed.,
2004).
26

The plurality opinion in Alvarez exemplifies

this approach, invoking negative theory to strike
down the government’s regulation of speech even
though the Court acknowledged that the regulated
lie involved no valuable expression. See supra notes
9-10 and accompanying text.

See id. at 1449-50 (“In addition to self-interest
narrowly conceived, past incidents of wrongful suppression or punishment of speech had been born of
officials’ intolerance: distaste for the message rather
than realistic concern for its practical effects. This
sort of intolerance for ideas accounted for much of
the censorship that governments had effected.”).
32

See Burt Neuborne, “Fighting Faiths,” Error
Deflection, and Free Speech, 51 Seton Hall L. Rev.
241, 241-56 (2020) (explaining Free Speech Clause
doctrine as appropriately infused by a heavy dose of
risk management, where the government’s potential
self-interest is a type of bias and thus a source of
potential risk of error).
33

overreaching manner. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730-32

See Cass, supra note 4, at 1473 (“The common
concern that informed progenitors of the speech
clause was the suppression of speech based on the
prejudices of the regulators; they did not intend to
restrict speech regulations that avoid social harm.
One possible approach to decision of speech claims
is simply to take this concern as the general principle
for decision of constitutional claims. The categorization effort identifies the cases in which prejudice-driven suppression is most likely and the cases
in which avoidance of social harm is most likely.
Strong presumptions of validity or invalidity then
could attach to these speech regulations.”).

(Breyer, J., concurring).

35

27

See Blasi, supra note 20, at 514 (“The choice of

perspective is likely to have its greatest impact at the
level of methodology, rhetoric, and abstract doctrinal formulation.”); Massaro & Norton, supra note
6, at 1657-63 (noting that other free speech theories
may instead serve as tiebreakers for solving First
Amendment problems).
28

Justice Breyer has long proposed such an

approach, urging that we weigh the harms of the
contested falsehood against the risk that the government will enforce the law in a self-interested or

29

In this essay, I use the term “lies” to mean a

speaker’s knowingly or recklessly false assertion
of fact made with the intention that the listener understand the assertion to be true. See Norton, supra
note 9, at 162 n.9.
30

Cass, supra note 4, at 1438-39.

31

Id. at 1443; see also id. at 1441-42 (“In each in-

stance, the limitations on government responded to
specific perceived abuses of government power. The

18

First Amendment’s concerns over the establishment
of a state religion, and over interference with free religious exercise, with speech and press, with assembly and petitions for redress of grievances all spring
from the same ground that gave rise to the rest of the
Bill of Rights. The phrasing of the amendments in
the negative—as limitations on government rather
than as self-contained guarantees of liberty—is emblematic of their genesis.”).
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34

Id. at 1478-79; see also id. at 1445 (describing
the framers’ generation as making a plea “for a more
limited freedom: freedom from wrongful speech
regulation. These writers, along with many who
followed them and invoked their imagery, believed
that government should be empowered to regulate
speech, but that in some, perhaps many, instances
government regulation of speech had been improper. Their effort was to illuminate the impropriety of
the particular sort of speech constraint with which
they were concerned.”).

See Hardin, supra note 2; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 Yale J. Reg. 413, 449
(2015) (“Choice architects are emphatically human,
and fully subject to behavioral biases; they are often
unreliable. . . . They might lack important information (the knowledge problem). They might be biased,
perhaps because their own parochial interests are at
stake (the public choice problem). They might themselves display behavioral biases—such as present
bias, optimistic bias, or probability neglect.”).
36

See James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic,
Behavioral Economics: Implications for Regulatory
Behavior, 41 J. Regul. Econ. 41, 42-43 (2012) (“[F]lawed
heuristics (e.g., availability, representativeness, optimism, and hindsight) and myopia are likely to lead
regulators to adopt policies closer to the preferences
of political overseers than they would otherwise. . . .
[T]he incentive structure for regulators is likely to reward those who adopt politically expedient policies,
either intentionally (due to a desire to please the political overseer) or accidentally (due to bounded rationality).”); Eyal Zamir & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan,
Explaining Self-Interested Behavior of Public-Spirited Policy Makers, 78 Pub. Admin. Rev. 579, 579 (2017)
(describing how government decision-makers “may
act in self-interested ways because of automatic and
unconscious motivations rather than deliberate and
conscious calculations”).
37

See Amy Kapczynski, The Lochnerized First
Amendment and the FDA: Toward a More Democratic
Political Economy, 118 Colum. L. Rev. 179, 203 (2018)
(“A more democratic First Amendment, and one still
recognizable in current doctrine, would also admit
that history and experience can help us distinguish
between settings in which governments are likely
to abuse their powers and settings in which governments are likely to be necessary to give effect to
collective judgments about how we wish to live and
order our values. Historical experience and empirical evidence can and should inform courts’ understandings of the markets and regulators in question.
Where evidence shows—as in the examples of drug
detailing and evidence production about medicines
and tobacco—that markets exhibit patterned forms
of power and disempowerment, First Amendment
analysis can and should take this into account. . . .
The answers are necessarily particular and derived
from experience, rather than abstract and rooted in
38

ungrounded assertions of market neutrality.”).
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S 155, 167 (2015);
see also id. at 167-68 (“Likewise, one could easily
imagine a Sign Code compliance manager who disliked the Church’s substantive teachings deploying
the Sign Code to make it more difficult for the Church
to inform the public of the location of its services. Accordingly, we have repeatedly ‘rejected the argument
that ‘discriminatory . . . treatment is suspect under
the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress certain ideas.’”).
39

Id. at 178-79 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 182
(Kagan, J., concurring).
40

Id. at 183 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“To do its intended work, of course, the category of content-based
regulation triggering strict scrutiny must sweep more
broadly than the actual harm; that category exists to
create a buffer zone guaranteeing that the government cannot favor or disfavor certain viewpoints.
But that buffer zone need not extend forever. We can
administer our content-regulation doctrine with a
dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws
that in no way implicate its intended function.”).
41

Id. (quoting Davenport v. Washington Ed. Assn.
551 U.S. 117, 189 (2007) (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 388 (1992))).
42

See Sophia Rosenfeld, Common Sense 227 (2011).
Even so, “common sense” has its limitations. See
id. at 256 (“[C]ommon sense, as both an informal
regulatory system and a political authority, also always threatens to undermine the democratic ideal:
blocking out truly new ideas, cutting off debate,
convincing us that simple, kitchen-table solutions
formulated by everyday people are necessarily better
than complex or specialized or scientific ones. . . .
Common sense ultimately works to help us talk to
each other but also to limit what we can hear and
from whom.”).
43

44

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 719 (2012).

45

Id. at 734-35.

Even so, Justice Breyer’s discussion of the requisite harm invites a variety of questions. How, if at
all, is “specific” harm distinct from “tangible” harm?
What is the difference between “particular” and
“specific” harm (and will either do)? How, if at all, is
a lie in settings where “tangible harm” is “especially
46
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likely to occur” distinct from a lie that is “particularly
likely” to cause harm?
47

Id. at 736.

Id. at 736-37 (“[I]n virtually all these instances
limitations of context, requirements of proof of injury, and the like, narrow the statute to a subset of
lies where specific harm is more likely to occur. The
limitations help to make certain that the statute does
not allow its threat of liability or criminal punishment to roam at large, discouraging or forbidding the
telling of the lie in contexts where harm is unlikely
or the need for the prohibition is small.”).
48

49

Id. at 719 (plurality opinion).

50

Id. at 723.

Id. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he pervasiveness of false statements, made for better or for
worse motives, made thoughtlessly or deliberately,
made with or without accompanying harm, provides
a weapon to a government broadly empowered to
prosecute falsity without more. And those who are
unpopular may fear that the government will use
that weapon selectively, say, by prosecuting a pacifist who supports his cause by (falsely) claiming to
have been a war hero, while ignoring members of
other political groups who might make similar false
claims.”).
51

52

Id. at 719 (plurality opinion).

class of cases, the ‘something more’ need not be a
showing of concrete tortious harm, but rather can
include a broad range of likely or even potential systemic harms that collectively make up the category
of compelling government interests.”).
54

Norton, supra note 53, at 165.

55

Id. at 148.

56

E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 709 (prohibiting a speaker’s

unauthorized use of federal agencies’ names in a
manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that the speaker’s message was approved or
endorsed by the agency); 18 U.S.C. § 912 (prohibiting
various misrepresentations that one is “an officer or
employee acting under the authority of the United
States”); Kan. Stat. § 21-5917 (criminalizing falsely
“representing oneself” to be a law enforcement officer).
57

See United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388, 395

(4th Cir. 2012) (describing lies about being a law enforcement officer as a type of “identity theft”).
58

E.g., Wilkes v. United States, 732 F.2d 1154 (3rd

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 964 (1984) (involving
lies told by someone claiming to be a Social Security
employee and demanding return of alleged “overpayments”); United States v. Romero, 293 F.3d 1120
(9th Cir. 2002) (involving lies told by a person claim-

53

ing to be an Immigration and Naturalization Service

and Lies: Deception and Truth-Telling in the Amer-

plications in exchange for money); United States v.

See Helen Norton, Lies To Manipulate, Misappropriate, and Acquire Government Power, in Law
ican Legal System 143, 175 (Austin D. Sarat ed., 2015)

(“Although Justice Breyer did not explain more specifically what he meant by ‘harm’ in these contexts,
we might understand ‘specific harm’ to mean the
listener’s actual reliance on the lie for decision-making purposes (where the harm of manipulation has
actually occurred); we might understand ‘material’
harm to refer to those lies that carry an increased risk
of manipulating listeners’ behavioral choices; and
we might understand ‘lies most likely to be harmful
or [i]n contexts where such lies are most likely to
cause harm’ as lies that have the intent to manipulate, and thus create the initial risk of manipulating,
listeners’ decisions.”); see also Martin H. Redish &
Julio Pereyra, Resolving the First Amendment’s Civil
War: Political Fraud and the Democratic Goals of Free

20

Expression, 62 Ariz. L. Rev. 451, 467 (2020) (“[I]n some
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employee and offering to expedite immigration apGilbert, 143 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 1998) (involving lies
told by persons claiming to be law enforcement officers told to avoid traffic tickets).
59

See United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702,

704-05 (1943) (interpreting federal law to prohibit
the defendant’s lie about being an FBI agent that
led his listener to divulge information about another
person’s location).
60

Id.

61

18 U.S.C. § 1001 (prohibiting materially false

statements “in any matter within the jurisdiction of
the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the
Government of the United States”). For a listing of
similar laws, see United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482,
505-07 nn.8-10 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

See United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S. 86, 93
(1941) (emphasizing Congress’s “intent to protect the
authorized functions of governmental departments
and agencies from the perversion which might result
from the deceptive practices described”).
62

63

See Catherine J. Ross, A Right to Lie?: Presidents,

Other Liars, and the First Amendment 13 (2021) (de-

scribing laws that prohibit “deception that interferes
with the administration of justice or the government’s functions”); id. at 25 (“[L]ying to government
investigators is a felony because it interferes with
fact-finding, justice, and governmental efficiency.”).
64

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 722 (2012).

Id. at 720. Laws restricting lies also trigger distrust when they apply to settings where speakers
may be unaware of the legal consequences of their
lies, thus increasing concerns about the government’s potential to abuse its power by unfairly or
selectively trapping the unwary. See United States v.
Brogan, 522 U.S. 398, 416 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(noting the dangers of permitting the government
to play “gotcha” by permitting “an overzealous
prosecutor or investigator—aware that a person has
committed some suspicious acts, but unable to make
a criminal case—[to] create a crime by surprising the
suspect, asking about those acts, and receiving a
false denial”).
65

Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010)
(upholding campaign disclosure requirements and
noting that this “transparency enables the electorate
to make informed decisions and give proper weight
to different speakers and messages”). Because a
speaker’s interest in keeping her identity secret because she reasonably fears abuse by power is meaningfully distinct from her interest in keeping her
identity secret to enable her to manipulate others,
Citizens United is distinguishable from NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (rejecting
the state’s efforts to require the NAACP to disclose its
members’ names and addresses at a time when civil
rights supporters were under siege in the South).
More specifically, the disclosures’ informational value to listeners was considerably greater in Citizens
United, and the speakers’ vulnerability to abuse if
their identities were disclosed was considerably
greater in NAACP v. Alabama.
66

67

Spencer Overton, State Power to Regulate Social

Media Companies to Prevent Voter Suppression, 53
U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1793, 1795 (2020).
See Ross, supra note 63, at 69 (describing deepfakes that falsely depicted then-candidate Biden as
saying “You won’t be safe in Joe Biden’s America”).
68

69

See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.

E.g., Treasurer of the Comm. to Elect Gerald D.
Lostracco v. Fox, 389 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986) (describing campaign advertisements that
misrepresented the candidate as the incumbent);
Ohio Democratic Party v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
07AP-876, 2008 WL 387836, *8 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)
(upholding a statute that prohibited a candidate’s
campaign literature from using the title of an office
not currently held by the candidate); Cook v. Corbett,
446 P.2d 179, 181 (Or. 1968) (describing nonincumbent candidate’s campaign advertisements urging
voters to “re-elect” her).
70

E.g., Linert v. MacDonald, 901 N.W.2d 664
(Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (rejecting a First Amendment
challenge by a candidate fined for falsely claiming
that the state Republican Party’s judicial election
committee had endorsed her candidacy).
71

Minnesota Voters All. v. Mansky, 138 U.S. 1876,
1889 n.4 (2018).
72

See Frederick Schauer, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
the Abrams Case, and the Origins of the Harmless
Speech Tradition, 51 Seton Hall L. Rev. 205, 224 (2020)
(“[I]n helping to launch the harmless speech tradition, Holmes may himself have contributed to still
another harm—the harm of believing that speech is
harmless.”).
73

United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 736 (2012)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
74
75

See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimate Lies and the Law

77-97 (2019).

Id. at 97-98; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, On
Trust, Law and Expecting the Worst, 133 Harv. L. Rev.
1963, 1972 (2020) (reviewing Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimate Lies and the Law (2019)) (“Perhaps courts’
rejection of such claims, then, stems from the ubiquity of the deceit. Its frequency may normalize it,
making it almost invisible to courts.”); id. at 1974
(“[D]ismissing suits for intimate deception is a form
of regulatory influence, just as vindicating such suits
76
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is a form of regulatory influence. In either case, the
law is structuring human relationships, either by
effecting a legal entitlement to be free from intimate
deception or by effecting a legal entitlement to deceive an intimate without consequence.”).
E.g., Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 728 (plurality opinion)
(“The American people do not need the assistance
of a government prosecution to express their high
regard for the special place that military heroes hold
in our tradition. Only a weak society needs government protection or intervention before it pursues
its resolve to preserve the truth. Truth needs neither
handcuffs nor a badge for its vindication.”).
77

78

G.S. Hans, Changing Counterspeech, 69 Clev. St.

L. Rev. 749, 753 (2021) (“[T]he contemporary prefer-

ence for counterspeech is based less on a search for
truth and more on the structural, political, and practical problems that government regulation of speech
entails.”); id. at 769 (“What seems to be underlying
the appeal of counterspeech is not the idea that it
helps us find the truth, but rather that it provides
an alternative to government regulation. Even if that
alternative is speculative or illusory, courts seem
eager to point to counterspeech as a better method
of combating speech than regulation.”).
See Thomas Gibbons, Providing a Platform for
Speech: Possible Duties and Responsibilities, in Pos79

itive Free Speech: Rationales, Methods and Implications 11 (Andrew T. Kenyon & Andrew Scott eds.,

2021) (noting that a negative rights approach “depends on assumptions that equality exists in speech
without government action, that rational debate will
take place and allow truth to emerge and be identified, and that government intervention to protect
speech would do more harm than non-intervention.
All those assumptions have limited support.”).
See Jack Balkin, To Reform Social Media, Reform
Informational Capitalism, in Social Media, Freedom
of Speech and the Future of Our Democracy 234 (Lee
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2022) (“People
who defend the freedom of speech often invoke an
abstract notion of ‘counter-speech’ by fellow citizens
that will somehow secure the promotion of knowledge or the protection of democracy. But that is not
how the public sphere actually works. The counter-speech may not occur; . . . it may not occur quickly
enough (for example to deal with lies and conspiracy
80
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theories). There may not be enough counter-speech,
it may not be efficacious, and in some cases, it may
be irrelevant, because the damage to privacy or selfworth may already have been done.”).
See Burt Neuborne, The First Amendment and
Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55 Brook.
L. Rev. 5, 50-51 (1989) (“In a hearer-centered system,
a weaker skepticism about the government’s ability
to make the empirical assessments needed to decide
whether a given communication is choice enhancing
or choice impeding has led to greater deference to
government attempts to censor allegedly harmful
commercial speech.”); Helen Norton, Powerful
Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. Colo. L. Rev. 441,
441-56 (2019) (discussing these asymmetries and
how law sometimes attends to them).
81

See Frederick Schauer, Constitutions of Hope
and Fear, 124 Yale L. J. 248, 528, 556 (2014) (reviewing
82

Robert C. Post, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance
Reform and the Constitution (2014)) (“[T]he Ameri-

can First Amendment tradition is a tradition of risk
aversion, and like all forms of risk aversion it chooses to minimize the risks of a certain kind even at the
expense of increasing the number of risks of another
kind.”).
83

Id. at 558.
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